Michigan Law Review
Volume 72

Issue 5

1974

United States v. Falk: Developments in the Defense of
Discriminatory Prosecution
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Military, War, and
Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, United States v. Falk: Developments in the Defense of Discriminatory Prosecution,
72 MICH. L. REV. 1113 (1974).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol72/iss5/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

April 1974]

Notes

1113

United States v. Falk: Developments in the
Defense of Discriminatory Prosecution
In October 1970, Jeffrey Falk was charged with refusing ·to
submit to induction into the U.S. Army, in violation of the Selective Service Act of 1967.1 The indictment alleged three additional
violations of that Act: failure to possess a registration card issued
in 1967, and failures to possess classification cards issued in 1968
148.
149.
150.
151.

See
See
See
See

text accompanying note 74 supra.
sources cited in note 136 supra.
sources cited in note 137 supra.
text accompanying notes 140-41 supra,

1. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (1970),
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and 1969. Prior to trial, Falk filed a motion to dismiss the cardcarrying counts, claiming that the government brought these charges
for the purpose of chilling his first amendment rights and punishing
him for his draft-counseling activities. The motion was denied by
the district judge without an evidentiary hearing. An offer of proof
of his contention was also rejected at trial. After Falk was found
guilty on all four counts by a jury verdict, the district judge acquitted
him on the induction-refusal count, ruling that Falk had been entitled to classification as a conscientious objector. Falk was then
sentenced to three consecutive one-year prison terms for the cardcarrying convictions.
A Seventh Circuit panel affirmed, Judge Sprecher dissenting.2
On rehearing en bane, however, that court, four-three, reversed the
panel and vacated Falk's conviction.8 Judge Sprecher,' writing for
the majority, found that the evidence established a prima facie case
of discriminatory enforcement of the draft card law. The case was
remanded for a hearing, at which the burden of going forward with
proof of nondiscrimination would rest on the government. Judge
Cummings, in dissent, argued that the court should not inquire
into the motivation of the prosecution; 4 that Falk's unsupported
allegations were insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing;rs and
that these allegations, even if true, would not establish that the
prosecution was impermissibly brought.6
It was not denied that Falk had committed a crime by violating
the draft card law. Nor was it denied that a showing of discriminatory prosecution of the law may, in some circumstances (for example, where the discrimination is based on race), provide a complete defense to a criminal charge. But the eight judges, including
the district judge, that considered the question divided evenly on
the applicability of this defense to Falk's prosecution. This Note
will first review the origin and development of the defense of discriminatory prosecution and will then analyze the situation in
United States v. Falk. The Note concludes that Falk is significant in
that it continues the device of shifting the burden to the prosecution
once a prima facie case of discriminatory enforcement has been established. More importantly, by implicitly eliminating the necessity
of showing purposeful discrimination, Falk represents an important
and praiseworthy development.
The defense of discriminatory prosecution stems from the case
2. United States v. Falk, 472 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1972), revd. en bane, 479 F.2d 616
(7th Cir. 1973).
ll. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1978).
4. 479 F.2d at 628-31.
5. 479 F.2d at 631-33.
6. 479 F.2d at 633-36.
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of Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 1 Yick Wo had been convicted of violating a
San Francisco ordinance that banned the operation of laundries in
buildings made of materials other than brick or stone unless consent
was obtained from the local board of supervisors. The defendant
had sought the required consent but had failed to obtain it, ·despite
the safe condition of his laundry.8 It was admitted that the board
had refused consent to all Chinese laundrymen, while consent had
been given to all but one non-Chinese laundrymen.9 The Supreme
Court found no fault in the statute; nevertheless, it granted a writ
of habeas corpus, holding that the unequal application of the ordinance was a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment: "Though the law itself be fair on
its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand,
so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimination between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial
of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."10
Thus, Yick Wo established that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment applies to executive, as well as legislative,
action by the states.11 The practical necessity for this result is compelling: A discriminatory classification that would be unconstitutional if created by a state statute should not be permissible if it is
created, instead, through selective enforcement by administrators
and prosecutors.
The discriminatory classification in Yick Wo was created by the
licensing board, rather than by enforcement officials. Hence, many
courts refused to consider similar claims where only prosecutorial
selectivity was challenged.12 Other courts found this distinction artificial in light of the Court's broad rationale in Yick Wo and allowed
discriminatory enforcement to be raised as a defense against discretionary actions of law enforcement officials.13 The dispute may have
7. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
8. 118 U.S. at 874.
9. 118 U.S. at 859.
IO. 118 U.S. at 873-74.
11. Cf. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 399, 347 (1880): "The constitutional provision •••
must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers
are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." See also Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal
Laws, 61 C0Lu11r. L. REv. 1103, 1105 n.9 (1961).
12. See, e.g., People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 117 P .2d 437 (1941); Society of
Good Neighbors v. Mayor of Detroit, 324 Mich. 22, 36 N.W. 2d 308 (1949); Bailleaux v.
Gladden, 230 Ore. 606, 370 P.2d 722, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 848 (1962). See also
Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61
CoLU!lr. L. REv. 1103 (1961); Comment, Intentional Discriminatory Enforcement of
Criminal Statute Held to Violate the Fifth Amendment, 55 MINN. L. R.Ev. 1234 (1971).
13. See, e.g., People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d
128 (1962); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 443 Pa. 305, 379 A.2d 26 (1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1008 (1971).
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been resolved by the Supreme Court's statement in Two Guys From
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 14 a case in which the owners
of a department store sought an injunction against further enforcement of a Pennsylvania Sunday-closing law, claiming that the law
was being discriminatorily enforced. Denying the injunction, the
Court noted: "[A]ppellant contends that there are still pending
prosecutions against its employees initiated as the result of the alleged discriminatory action. Since appellant's employees may de/encl
against any such proceeding that is actually prosecuted on the ground
of unconstitutional discrimination, we do not believe the court below was incorrect in refusing to exercise its injunctive powers at that
time."15 The Court did not say that discriminatory prosecution would
be a valid defense; it only noted that the possibility of establishing
such a defense justified the denial of immediate injunctive relief.
But, since this dictum, the defense has routinely been recognized,
even where the crime charged was not the result of a discriminatory
administrative decision16 and the defendant had admittedly committed a crime.11
14. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
15. 366 U.S. at 58&-89 (emphasis added). See also Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 857,
359 (1953).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972); People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 263, 63
Cal. Rptr. 211, 215 (1967); People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 779, 252
N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964). See also United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1973);
Givelber, Selective Enforcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 U. !LL. L.F. 88, 93 n.19
("It is clearly the case that courts which have recently considered the problem regularly
accept the principle that discriminatory prosecution violates the equal protection
clause.").
17. It may seem illogical to exonerate a guilty defendant simply because the
prosecutor erred. Cf., e.g., People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587-88 (1926)
("because the constable has blundered"). However, as with the e.xclusionary rule for
illegally obtained evidence, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), there does not seem
to be any other way to force the prosecution to respect the dictates of the Constitution.
But see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Petitions for writs of mandamus to compel
prosecution of known offenders have been filed, but they have uniformly been denied
on the ground of the separation-of-powers doctrine. See Powell v. Katzenbach, 359
F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963), a/fd, sub
nom. Moses v. Katzenbach, 342 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Even were mandamus avail•
able, it might not be practical or desirable to require prosecution of all known offenders
of, for example, gambling laws or the draft card law. See Breitel, Controls in Criminal
Law Enforcement, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 427 (1960); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To
Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice,
69 VALE L.J. 543, 586-88 (1960). See also Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481-82
(D.C. Cir. 1967). Injunctions ordering equal treatment of all future offenders have also
been sought, but generally without success. O'Shea v. Littleton, 42 U.S.L.W. 4139 (U.S.,
Jan. 15, 1974); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, reh. denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968). But
see Wade v. City of San Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d 181 (1947); Covington
v. Gausepohl, 250 Ky. 323, 62 S.W.2d 1040 (1933).
It should also be noted that a finding of discriminatory enforcement need only result
in a dismissal of the charge, not in an acquittal (see, e.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482
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Of course, the failure to prosecute some offenders because of the
prosecution's lack of knowledge of the crime or because of the
insufficiency of the evidence does not deny equal protection to those
who are prosecuted.18 At the least, the defendant must show that the
law is not being enforced against offenders who are known to the
prosecution and who are "in similar circumstances [to the defendant],
material to their rights." 19 The nature of the rights that cannot be
infringed by prosecutorial classifications was partially clarified by
the Supreme Court in Oyler v. Boles.20 Oyler was sentenced under
West Virginia's habitual criminal statute, which provided a mandatory life sentence upon a third conviction of certain serious crimes.
He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was discriminated against in that 904 other three-time offenders had not
been given mandatory life sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed
a denial of habeas corpus. The Court noted the absence of any allegation that the prosecution knew of the prior convictions of the
904 others and then added: "Moreover, the conscious exercise of
some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation. Even though the statistics in this case might imply
a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the selection
was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religfon, or other arbitrary classification."21
The terms "unjustifiable standard" and "arbitrary classification;'
suggest that the Court is referring to the now-familiar equal protection rubric of "rational relation," "suspect classifications," and
"compelling state interests"22 and will utilize these tests in cases of
discriminatory prosecution, as well as in cases where the law itself
is challenged as unconstitutional._ It seems reasonable to subject
both legislative and prosecutorial classifications to basically the same
test under the equal protection clause.23 Indeed, this would seem
to be the essence of Yick Wo.24
F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962)); thus, it would seem that the defendant could still be convicted if
the government brings a new indictment that is not based on a discriminatory policy.
But see Comment, supra note 11, at 1112.
18. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Washington v. United States, 401 F.2d 915,
925 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
19. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
20. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
21. 368 U.S. at 456 (emphasis added).
22. See text accompanying notes 55-60 infra. For a thorough discussion of these tests,
see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969). See also
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Ev_olving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L REv. I (1972).
23. See Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints,
42 S. CAL. L. REv. 519, 541 (1969); note 11 supra.
24. See 118 U.S. at 372-74.
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It has been suggested25 that it is not the proper function of
enforcement officials to make broad policy decisions that create
classifications, even if such classifications would be legitimate if
passed by a legislature. This would indicate that a reviewing court
owes more deference to the judgment of a legislature than to that
of an administrator. In any case, the classification will have the
same effect on constitutional rights regardless of whether it was
made by a legislature or an administrator. Therefore, it should at
least be submitted to the same judicial tests under the equal protection clause, although the courts may appropriately indulge in a
stronger presumption of legitimacy where the classification is devised
by a legislature.26 However, in ruling on equal protection challenges
in discriminatory prosecution cases, courts customarily refer only
to the Oyler Court's phrase, "race, religion, or other arbitrary clas•
sification,"27 and do not advert to the minimum rationality or strict
scrutiny tests.28
In contrast to their approach in evaluating the constitutionality
of legislative classifications, courts have generally required a showing
of purposeful discrimination in selective enforcement cases.20 Oyler
stated that a policy of selective enforcement would be upheld unless
it were "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard."80 The
implication of "deliberately" is not at all clear. It may mean only
that there must be awareness of other offenders, that is, that the
prosecution must be conscious that it is selectively enforcing the law.
But the .Oyler Court, in support of its statement, cited Snowden v.
Hughes,81 a case that used the words "intentional'' and "purposeful"
in a way that implied bad faith, or awareness of the unjustifiability
of the standard of selection. Snowden was one of several candidates
running for state representative in an Illinois Republican primary
election. Under a proportional representation scheme authorized
25. Comment, supra note 11, at 1117-18; Developments in the Law-Equal Pro•
tection, supra note 22, at 1077-87.
26. But see Givelber, supra note 16, at 119 n.124: "The question is whether a given
instance of selective enforcement is rationally related to legitimate administrative
purposes, not whether the legislature could have written a law incorporating the
policies that the administrator employs."
27. 368 U.S. at 456. See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 401 F.2d 915, 924 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (dictum); People v. Sawicki, 4 Mich. App. 467, 476-77, 145 N.W.2d 286, 240
(1966); Dimaggio v. Brown, 19 N.Y.2d 283, 290, 225 N.E.2d 871, 875, 279 N.Y.S.2d 161,
166 (1967).
28. See text accompanying notes 55-60 infra. This may be due to the fact that courts
still require a showing of bad faith in discriminatory prosecution cases. See cases cited
in note 37 infra. A finding of bad faith means that the state interest advanced is itself
unconstitutional, so the prosecutorial policy fails the minimum rationality test, and
there is no need for further inquiry as to the "fundamental" interests affected.
~9. See cases cited in note 27 supra.
30. 368 U.S. at 456.
31. 368 U.S. at 456, citing 321 U.S. I (1944).
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by statute, two candidates were to be nominated on the Republican
ticket, but the State Primary Canvassing Board designated only one
nominee and excluded Snowden, who had received the second
highest vote total. No reason for the Board's action was alleged in
the complaint. Snowden's civil suit to recover damages for infringement of his civil rights was dismissed, and the Supreme Court
affirmed:
[W]here the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the
statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without
more a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute
fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who
are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection
unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional
or purposeful discrimination.32

Snowden appears to require a showing of actual malice. But this
requirement should be applied only in cases of alleged discrimination against a lone complainant or defendant. Where there is no
allegation of selectivity against an identifiable class, the existence of
an unjustifiable standard can only be demonstrated by showing the
subjective motivation of the administrator or prosecutor. Where the
existence of an impermissible standard can be shown by objective
criteria, there should be no need to prove that the standard was
applied with malice.33 The Supreme Court apparently recognized
this distinction in a later case, Edelman v. California,34 where it
referred to "the necessity of showing systematic or intentional dis.:
crimination."35 Moreover, Snowden was a civil action against the
administrator for damages. It may be legitimate to require a showing
of bad faith in such an action, in order to prevent the administrator
from being held liable for a good faith mistake,36 but this rationale
would not apply to a case of alleged discriminatory prosecution,
where the relief sought is merely dismissal of charges. There is,
therefore, no need to interpret Snowden and Oyler as requiring a
showing of malice in all cases in which the party seeks to establish
discriminatory prosecution.
Nevertheless, many lower courts have cited Snowden in inapposite situations and may, therefore, be utilizing a bad faith test.37
82. 321 U.S. at 8.

llll. See Givelber, supra note 16, at 113-14 n.110.
34. 344 U.S. 857 (1958).
35. 344 U.S. at 359 (dictum; emphasis added).
36. See Horowitz, Unseparate but Equal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment
Issues in Public Education, 13 UCLA L. R.Ev. 1147, 1152 (1966).
87. See, e.g., Shock v. Tester, 405 F-2d 852, 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 894 U.S.
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Since duly enacted statutes are routinely struck down under the equal
protection clause without any inquiry into the bad faith of the
legislature, it seems anomalous to require a showing of prosecutorial
malice in discriminatory enforcement cases. Furthermore, since
courts are historically loathe to inquire into the motivation of the
executive branch,88 such a requirement puts a defendant in something of a dilemma: He is required to prove a fact that the court will
not let him establish by direct questioning of the prosecution, a
method of proof that may well be the only means available.
In most cases where the defense of discriminatory enforcement
has been raised, it is impossible to tell whether the court is utilizing
a bad faith test, for the defendant must first establish what the
standard of selectivity is before he can attack it as unjustifiable and
the evidence that tends to show the standard used generally indicates
prosecutorial malice as well.30 Hence, in those cases where the
defense is allowed, it is impossible to say whether the court inferred
malice or simply regarded malice as irrelevant to the question of
whether the standard employed was constitutional. In at least one
case,40 the prosecutor had apparently relied on citizen complaints to
bring violations to his attention and had enforced the law uniformly
against all reported violators. Although there is no clear prosecutorial
bad faith in such a policy, it may still constitute discrimination of
the first magnitude, due to the selectivity exercised by the complaining citizenry.41 Here, too, if the court were to allow the defense of
discriminatory prosecution, it would not be clear whether the bad
faith of the complainants was being attributed to the prosecutor or
prosecutorial connivance was being inferred or no finding of malice
was being required at all.
Even assuming that no showing of malice is required, the
defendant usually faces grave difficulties merely in proving that an
1020 (1969); United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912, 927 (M.D. Pa. 1972); United
States v. Hercules, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 102, 104 (D. Kan. 1971); People v. Gray, 254 Cal.
App. 2d 256, 268, 63 Cal. Rptr. 211, 219 (1967); People v. Gillespie, 41 Mich. App. 748,
751, 201 N.W.2d 104, 105 (1972). Cf. Rhinehart v. Rhay, 440 F.2d 718, 727 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1971).
38. E.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130-31 (1810) (dictum); Newman V.
United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th
Cir. 1965). But see Professor Davis' strong criticism of this attitude in K. DAVIS, DisCRETIONARY JUSTICE! A PRELIMINARY INQUffiY 209-10 (1969).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972); People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1967); People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 779, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96
(1964).
40. People v. Tornatore, 46 Misc. 2d 908, 261 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Poughkeepsie City Ct,
1965).
41. See People v. Tornatore, 46 Misc. 2d 908, 261 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Poughkeepsie City Ct.
1965).
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unjustifiable standard led to his prosecution.42 Discriminatory prosecution is an affirmative defense, so the burden of proof on this issue
rests with the defendant.43 Evidence of the actual standard employed
is, for the most part, solely ·within the prosecutor's control and unavailable to the defendant.44 The problem of proof may be reduced,
however, if courts are willing to allow inferences from statistical
data40 or strong circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie
case of discriminatory enforcement, thereby shifting to the government the burden of going forward with the evidence.46 This was
done in United States v. Crowthers,41 which involved a government
regulation that required a permit for the holding of an assembly at
the Pentagon. The fact that Pentagon officials had enforced this
regulation against a prayer service for peace in Vietnam, but not
against a demonstration welcoming then Vice-President Agnew, was
sufficient for the Court to infer that the selective enforcement policy
was based on speech content, rather than on some permissible
grounds. Consequently, the Court imposed on the government the
burden of proving nondiscrimination.48
But the defendant can only benefit from burden shifting after he
has succeeded in establishing a prima facie case. The defendant's
.

'

42. See generally Comment, The Viability of Discriminatory Prosecution as a Defense to a Criminal Charge, 19 LOYOLA L. REv. 318 (1973).
43. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973). Generally, the
defense must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. See People v. Utica
Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 18, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, 134 (1962). See also People v.
Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 63 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1967).
44. See United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 180-81 (3d Cir. 1973); United States
v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912, 928 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Comment, supra note 42.
45. Compare People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1960) with
People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App. 2d 876, 342 P.2d 538 (1959). See also People v. Gray,
254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 268-69, 63 Cal. Rptr. 211, 219-20 (1967).
46. United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United Stat.es v. Crowthers,
456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972). See also Givelber, supra note 16, at 1006-12. But cf.
United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912, 928-29 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
47. 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
48. "It is neither novel nor unfair to require the party in possession of the facts to
disclose them." 456 F.2d at 1078. See also United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th
Cir. 1972). Professor Givelber gives cogent theoretical support for this device. Givelber,
supra note 16, at 106-12.
Steele and Crowthers both involved actions of the federal government, which, of
course, is not subject to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause. But the fifth amendment's due process clause has been held to include a
guarantee of equal protection in some circumstances. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 64H2 (1969); Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954); Washington v. United States, 401 F.2d 915, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 1968), quoting Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886): "We think that it may safely be decided that in the
sober relationship of the citizenry to the criminal laws, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth contains the same 'pledge of the protection of equal laws' as is evident from the
Fourteenth."
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basic problem in shmving the standard of selection used is that this
standard may exist only in the prosecutor's mind.49 Allowing the
defendant to call the prosecutor as a witness would encourage dilatory tactics50 without really helping the defendant, who could only
guess at the actual standard employed and thus would have no real
basis on which to attack the credibility of the prosecutor's statements.
Moreover, if the decision to prosecute is made by a hierarchy of
several officials, as it apparently was in Falk, 61 which official's motivation should be the deciding factor? A far more effective solution has
been suggested by Professor Davis: "Prosecutors, in my opinion,
should be required to make and to announce rules that will guide
their choices, stating as far as practicable what will and what will
not be prosecuted, and they should be required otherwise to structure
their discretion." 52 Such a requirement not only would make it
easier for individual defendants to challenge the constitutionality of
the standards employed but also would permit the wisdom of those
standards to be subject to normal political processes. Very few prosecutors and administrative agencies have announced such rules. 118 But
if and when such rules are adopted, they ,vill generally give the
defendant prima facie evidence of the selection standard leading to
his prosecution. He may then concentrate his efforts on what should
be the crux of the issue: whether that standard violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
As noted above,1>4 the equal protection clause should impose the
same requirements on a prosecutorial classification as it does on a
legislative one. The basic requirement for the latter is that the
classification bear a rational relationship to a permissible governmental purpose. Until quite recently, 55 few statutory classifications
failed this test, 58 since legislative action carried such a strong presumption of constitutionality.57 However, where the classification
created is historically suspect58 or affects a fundamental interest,n°
it will be subjected to the far more rigorous "strict scrutiny" test:
49. See K. DAVIS, supra note 38, at 224.
50. See Falk, 479 F.2d at 631 n.8 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
51. 479 F.2d at 622.
52. K. DAVIS, supra note 38, at 225.
53. Professor Davis notes one outstanding exception: the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 205-07.
54. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
55. An excellent discussion of recent cases is found in Gunther, supra note 22.
56. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), is a leading example of one that failed.
57. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
But see note 62 infra.
58. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race).
59. E.g., Hatper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting).
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The classification will be declared to be a violation of equal protection unless it is necessary to further a compelling state interest. To
date, no classification, legislative or administrative, has ever satisfied
this test.60
Although the courts have not used these tests in discriminatory
prosecution cases, perhaps because Oyler and Yick Wo were decided
before the two-tiered analysis was developed, it seems reasonable to
utilize that approach. 61 Most cases are readily explainable in terms
of such an analysis. For example, in Crowthers, the Court inferred
that individuals were prosecuted for violating the ordinance regulating demonstrations at the Pentagon only if their demonstrations
were not favorably viewed by Pentagon officials. It could have been
argued that this selection standard satisfied the minimum rationality
test because, for example, antiwar demonstrations might have a more
demoralizing effect on Pentagon employees than would other demonstrations. But the right to hold peaceful assemblies-of whatever
character-is an interest protected by the first amendment against
congressional infringement. The interests protected by the first
amendment are "fundamental," 62 although, where they are infringed
by state action, courts may invoke the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, rather than the equal protection clause, to invalidate the action. 63 Since a fundamental interest is involved, the selection standard used by the Pentagon officials must be subjected to the
compelling state interest test-which it could not have survived. The
Crowthers court did not speak expressly in these terms, but reached
the same result: "For officials of the United States government to
selectively and discriminatorily enforce [the regulation] so as to turn
it into a scheme whereby activities protected by the First Amend60. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
But cf. Bums v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
61. See Givelber, supra note 16, at 117 n.118.
62. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
30-31 (1968). See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 16 n.39
(1973); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268, 272 (1951).
In recent yeats, some members of the Court have indicated a desire to move away
from the two-tiered analysis of equal protection toward some sliding scale approach
(see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)) or, more
likely, toward a "heightened" requirement of rationality in cases on the lower tier
(see Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)). See also Gunther, supra note 22. But,
regardless of the specific analysis used, it seems safe to assert that the involvement of a
first amendment interest in a challenged classification would be a very considerable
weight in the decisional scales.
63. See Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885
(1946); Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Cf. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 22, at 1128. But cf. Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965).
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ment are allowed or prohibited in the uncontrolled discretion of
these officials violates the defendants' right to equal protection of the
laws embraced within the due process of law clause of the Fifth
Amendment. " 64
The situation in United States v. Steele 65 was similar to that in
Crowthers. Steele was one of four defendants in Hawaii charged with
refusing to answer questions on the 1970 census form, in violation of
a federal statute. He alleged discriminatory prosecution, pointing to
the fact that the only offenders in the state that were prosecuted were
those who had publicly participated in a census resistance movement,
even though at least six other violators must have been known to the
government. Since the alleged prosecutorial standard discriminated
on the basis of speech content, the case could have been analyzed
under the equal protection clause as suggested above in connection
with Crowthers. But the Ninth Circuit, after citing Yick Wo and
noting that the due process clause of the fifth amendment accords
the same equal protection guarantee to a federal defenaant, 60 stated
simply that "Steele is entitled to an acquittal if his evidence proved
that the authorities purposefully discriminated against those who
chose to exercise their First Amendment rights.'' 67 The evidence was
found sufficient to prove that this was the standard employed, and
Steele's conviction·was reversed.
In Steele, the government denied that it had exercised any selectivity at all, claiming unsuccessfully that it had prosecuted all similar
_offenses that had been discovered. 68 The court might have reached a
different decision if the government had instead admitted the exercise of some selectivity and then attempted to show that the selection
standard was constitutionally permissible. Few facts are given in the
opinion, but it appears that the government could have argued that
its selection standard was to prosecute only those offenses that were
likely to have a strong deterrent effect on potential offenders-and
that offenses by vocal census resistors would have a broader impact
than would offenses by ordinary citizens. A somewhat similar
standard was approved, in dictum, by the New York Appellate
Division in People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co.: "Selective enforcement
may also be justified when a striking example or a few examples are
sought in order to deter other violators, as part of a bona fide
rational pattern of general enforcement, in the expectation that general compliance will follow and that further prosecutions will be
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

456 F.2d at 1080.
461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972).
See note 48 supra.
461 F.2d at 1151.
461 F.2d at 1152.
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unnecessary." 69 Since a "striking example" policy of selective prosecu.:
tion is not deliberately aimed at punishing the exercise of free speech,
the Steele court might simply have upheld the conviction for failure
to show prosecutorial malice or bad faith. But if the court were not
to regard malice as a sine qua non,70 it would have to decide whether
such a standard of selection was "unjustifiable" within the meaning
of Oyler. The government's interest in enfqrcing its criminal law
through a "striking example" policy is legitimate; there is little
doubt that such a policy would survive the traditional minimum
rationality test, but whether it would have survived a higher standard is unclear.
The form of Steele's protest was not adequately described by the
opinion. It could have constituted either regulable conduct71 • or
protected free speech. If it were the latter, the policy would adversely
affect the exercise of freedom of speech-an interest regarded as
fundamenta172-and would have to undergo the stricter scrutiny of
the compelling governmental interest test. Whether strict scrutiny
should be applied would depend on the actual facts surrounding
Steele's protest activities. Any adverse impact on first amendment
rights would have to be weighed against the government's legitimate
interest in the "striking example" policy, and less restrictive alternatives would have to be considered.
Applying equal protection analysis to Falk may clarify the court's
opinion. The first step in that analysis is to determine the policy used
by the prosecution. The majority in Falk held that the evidence at
trial made out at least a prima facie case of improper discriminatory
enforcement of the draft card law, in violation of the equal protection aspect of the fifth amendment's due process clause. However,
the opinion did not clearly define the prosecutorial policy that the
court found to be improper. This resulted in some confusion: The
dissenting opinions attacked the adequacy of Falk's showing that the
prosecution was deliberately brought to punish him for his draft
counseling activity-an enforcement policy that might not have
been the subject of the majority's holding. Indeed, the opinions
allude to three possible prosecutorial policies.
In his pretrial motion to dismiss the card-carrying counts of the
69. 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 21, 225 N.Y.S.2d 126, lll6 (1962). See also Schwartz, Federal
Criminal Jurisprudence and Prosecutor's Discretion, 13 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 64, 84
(1948).
70. See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
71. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968): "[W]hen 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are co~bined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms."
72. See note 62 supra.
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indictment, Falk alleged that the government had deliberately
selected for prosecution those offenders whose legal activities (draft
counseling and opposition to the Vietnam War) were disfavored and
that such prosecution was purely for the purpose of punishing and
stifling these protected first amendment activities. In support of his
motion, Falk claimed that over 25,000 other registrants had violated
the draft card law but had not been indicted.73 At trial, Falk's
attorney offered to prove that the Assistant U.S. Attorney who was
prosecuting the case had told him that few indictments were brought
for nonpossession of draft cards, and that the government had
brought the card-carrying charges against Falk in part because of his
draft counseling activity. The holdings in Steele and Crowthers make
it clear that such a policy, if proved, would be unconstitutional and
would justify a dismissal of the indictment. It is hard to avoid the
conclusion that Falk was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to establish that this was the reason for his indictment on the card-carrying
counts.74
But Falk had not yet demonstrated prima facie that intentional
discrimination against the exercise of first amendment rights was the
government's policy, so the burden of proving that fact should rest
on him at the evidentiary hearing on remand. As the dissenting
opinion of Judge Cummings pointed out at length, Falk had merely
made unsupported allegations as to this policy.75 He attempted to
corroborate his charge by citing a 1969 policy statement of the
Director of the Selective Service System that indicated that registrants
who turned in their draft cards would not be prosecuted; instead,
their induction orders would be punitively accelerated. This statement was offered to show that the government had violated its own
policy in prosecuting Falk.76 However, that policy statement was
78. Judge Cummings' dissent correctly observes that Falk failed to allege whether
the government was aware of the 25,000 other alleged violations. 479 F.2d at 627 n.4.
Of course, if the government were unaware of other violators, enforcement against Falk
could not be discriminatory. But Falk's allegations clearly imply governmental knowl•
edge of the other offenses, and it would be a mere technicality to insist on a more
precisely stated claim. Compare People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96, 200
N.E.2d 779 (1964). See also Givelber, supra note 16, at 112: "The rule of pleading articulated by the Court in Oyler reflects neither sensitivity to the problems presented by the
highly selective enforcement of the law nor an objective evaluation of the needs of
administrators and courts."
74. At least one court allows the issue of discriminatory enforcement to be raised
at trial as a question for the jury, see People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 63 Cal,
Rptr. 211 (1967); other courts, however, consider that a pretrial motion to dismiss is
the proper procedure, see, e.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 175 (1978);
People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962).
See generally, Annot., 4 AL.R.lld 404, 412-17 (1965). Falk's counsel attempted to raise
the issue both at pretrial and at trial to ensure against possible procedural default,
472 F.2d at 1108.
75. 479 F.2d at 681-88.
76. See United States v. Leahey, 484 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970).
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issued before the Supreme Court's decision in Gutknecht v. United
States,71 which banned the issuance of accelerated induction orders as
a punishment for violations of Selective Service regulations. The
majority recognized that it was "possible" that the government had
changed its policy of nonprosecution in the light of Gutknecht but
felt that it was "incumbent upon the government to come forward
with evidence that it had in fact changed its policy ...." 78 However,
the 1969 statement seems slim evidence, indeed, of the government's
post-Gutknecht policy. & Judge Cummings commented in his dissent: "The majority finds it suspicious that the Government, instead
of blinking at criminal conduct, should enforce the law by prosecution when the administrative means of enforcement . • . was foreclosed. Respectfully, it appears any suspicion is a product of predisposition."711 It is doubtful that the majority's finding that a prima
facie case of discrimination had been made can be supported by the
evidence of deliberate suppression of Falk's draft counseling activities.80 The justification for shifting the burden should have been
derived from evidence of some other prosecutorial policy.
A second possible policy is that Falk was indicted because his
case would present a "striking example."81 Although Falk was not a
prominent public figure, he was a draft counselor, and his prosecution could be expected to have a relatively high deterrent effect on
potential offenders. The dissenters, quoting the panel decision, apparently felt that such a prosecutorial policy would be permissible:
" '[S]elect enforcement of a law against someone in a position to
influence others is unquestionably a legitimate prosecutorial
scheme. . . .' " 82 They described this policy as a "sensible enforcement scheme of securing general compliance through prosecution of
those who defiantly violate the law in the public eye." 83 This latter
statement contemplates selective enforcement against those whose
offenses are committed openly, rather than against those offenders
who are prominent because of their modes of expression or legitimate conduct. But the panel's reference to "someone in a position
to influence others" suggests a policy aimed at highly visible of77. 396 U.S. 295 (1970),
78. 479 F.2d at 621.
79. 479 F.2d at 633.
80. Possibly, the majority believed that the draft board was guilty of deliberate
discrimination in refusing to grant conscientious objector status to Falk. This would
be analogous to the actions of the licensing board in Yick Wo and would be a solid
basis for a finding of discriminatory prosecution. But the opinion makes no mention of
willful misconduct by the draft board.
81. Cf. text accompanying note 69 supra.
82, 479 F.2d at 634 (Cummings, J., dissenting), quoting from the earlier panel decision 472 F.2d at 1108. No authority is cited for this proposition.
83. 479 F.2d at 634 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
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fenders, rather than offenses. The distinction is important. The governmental interest in a selection policy aimed at highly visible offenses could be very substantial-even "compelling." Selective prosecution of highly visible offenses may be justified by the need to
avoid the destructive example that such offenses would set if unpunished. This rationale should not be accepted when the government, simply to get widespread publicity, selectively prosecutes
offenders who happen to be prominent, especially where their prominence is due to the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
There is, however, no evidence or claim that Falk's offense was
highly visible. True, he mailed his draft cards to the U.S. Attorney
General, a federal district judge, and his draft board. 8st But these
actions are not highly visible in themselves and apparently were not
publicized. Moreover, his indictment was not brought until more
than a year after the last such offense, long after any publicity
attendant to the act would have faded. Hence, if high visibility is at
all involved in this case, it is the high visibility of Falk personally,
rather than of his offense; the minority's comment simply does not
apply here.
A third possible selection standard was evidenced by another portion of the aforementioned Selective Service policy statement: " '[l]t
would seem that when a registrant is willing to be inducted, he should
not be prosecuted for minor ofjenses committed during his processing.' " 85 This policy would have been unaffected by the Gutknecht
decision and, therefore, was presumably still in force. The government had apparently decided not to prosecute draft card offenses
until an induction order had been issued and disobeyed, in order to
give the offender a chance to join the Army. This policy would
explain the delay in bringing the card-carrying charges against Falk
until the charge for refusing induction was brought. 86 The majority
states: "The conclusion would seem to be compelling that, in the
admitted policy of the Selective Service officials and apart from
whether Falk's draft counseling activities were involved in the
decision to prosecute, he was indicted and prosecuted for violation
of the card possession requirements only because he exercised his
First Amendment privilege to claim a statutory right as a conscientious objector."87
The Selective Service statement seems to provide an adequate
84. 4'72 F.2d at 1103.
85. 4'79 F.2d at 622, quoting L. HERSHEY, LEGAL AsPEcrs OF SELEcnVE SERVICE 46-47
(1969) (emphasis added by court).
86. But Judge Cummings points out that this delay is more probably due to the
effect of the pre-Gutknecht procedure of utilizing punitive induction orders rather
than prosecuting for card offenses. 479 F.2d at 635 n.15. Thus, the delay in bringing
charges provides little indication as to which policy the government was pursuing.
87. 479 F.2d at 623.

April 1974]

Notes

1129

prima facie showing that the government's policy was to enforce the
card-carrying law (a "minor offense") against registrants who refused
to obey induction orders-legally or illegally-but not against those
who submitted to induction. The seemingly benign policy of enforcing the draft card law only against those who resist an induction
order allows any offender of that law to escape prosecution simply by
submitting to induction when called. This is a realistic option for
almost all offenders except conscientious objectors.88 The result of
this policy, then, is to grant a benefit to all those who do not have
religious scruples against war.
The majority held that this policy was unconstitutional because
it chilled a conscientious objector's right to resist an invalid induction order.89 The dissent responded, "[Falk's] First Amendment
rights were freely exercised when he claimed CO status. No First
Amendment rights were implicated in anything that transpired thereafter.''90 The majority's opinion was a departure from previous case
law in one fundamental respect. There is absolutely no indication
that this chilling of first amendment rights was an intended effect of
the policy expressed in the memorandum. No malice, bad faith, or
purposeful discrimination could be established. Under the language
of Oyler and Snowden, therefore, selective prosecution based on this
policy would have been permissible.91 But the majority apparently
held otherwise.
At this point, Judge Sprecher's majority opinion understandably
becomes a bit hazy. Lacking clear precedent for the proposition that
an unintentional chilling effect is enough to support a claim of discriminatory enforcement, he relies on Cox v. Louisiana92 and
88, Those offenders entitled to deferments because of the need for immediate medical care, who are nevertheless issued induction orders, are also faced with a
dilemma. Although the right to medical treatment is not explicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution, as is the right to free exercise of religion, a strong case could be made
that the challenged policy denies equal protection to those entitled to such medical
deferments. Cf. Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1970).
Of course, any offender who is issued an invalid induction order-even through
sheer clerical error-would be aggrieved by the fact that he may be prosecuted for
card-carrying offenses if he refuses to obey the invalid order. But such an offender
could not complain about unequal treatment any more than if the prosecutorial policy
were to select offenders by lot.
89. A conscientious objector's right to resist an induction order is essential to the
first amendment's free exercise of religion clause. In contrast, the selection policies
previously discussed allegedly chilled rights guaranteed by the first amendment's freedom of speech clause.
Note that the only reason for the remand is to allow the government to show that
the policy of enforcing the draft card law only against those who resist an induction
order was not the reason for Falk's prosecution. See note 104 infra.
90. 479 F. 2d at 636.
91. See text accompanying notes 21, 31-32 supra.
92. 479 F.2cl at 623, citing 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965).
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Crowthers. 93 In Cox, the leader of a civil rights demonstration was
convicted of obstructing public ways. The Court reversed, apparently94 holding the statute at issue unconstitutional as applied because of the broad discretion vested in local officials to grant or
refuse permits to hold public demonstrations. The decision was based
on due process, rather than equal protection. Moreover, the potential
for intentional racial discrimination was an important aspect of the
case. The selection standard held unconstitutional in Crowthers was
deliberately aimed at chilling the exercise of first amendment rights;
therefore, that case is also inapposite.95
However, the majority's holding is consistent with equal protection principles regularly employed by courts in reviewing the constitutionality of statutory classifications. At a minimum, the classification created must bear a rational relationship to some legitimate
governmental purpose. 96 The Selective Service statement explains the
purpose of the policy under consideration: " ..• reducing the number
of cases that reach the courts and also giving the registrant, before
being prosecuted, an opportunity to report for service in the armed
forces." 97 This implies that there were two rationales for the policy:
administrative efficiency in enforcement, and encouraging compliance with orders to report for induction. The question becomes
whether or not these interests are furthered by the classification inherent in the policy.
With regard to administrative efficiency, it could be argued that
postponing indictments for draft card law offenses not only gives the
offender a chance to join the Anny but also spares the government
the expense of trying these cases. Further, it is arguably more economical to enforce the card-carrying offenses against offenders who
are at the same time charged with refusing induction. But, assuming
that deterrence is the major goal of enforcing the draft card law, the
93. 479 F.2d at 623, citing 456 F.2d at 1080.
94. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup,
Cr. REv.1.

95. The majority also cites, 479 F.2d at 623, Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion in Dixon
v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In that case, Dixon had com•
plained about the conduct of two police officers who had stopped him for alleged traffic
offenses. The prosecutor apparently agreed not to prosecute the traffic charge if Dixon
would make no further complaint. Several weeks later Dixon filed a complaint with
the D.C. Council on Human Relations. In retaliation, the traffic charges were filed
against him. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that the prosecution
was proper. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered
the charges dismissed, not on constitutional grounds, but on the need to prevent agree•
ments that attempt to protect the police from misconduct complaints. In the instant
case no similar government misconduct is involved. Falk had not threatened to file
complaints against the draft board or anyone else, so the rationale of Dixon is inapplicable.
96. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
97. 479 F,2d at 622, quoting L. HERSHEY, supra note 85, at 46-47.
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efficiency of any policy must be judged by the deterrent effect that
results from a fixed output of prosecutorial resources. This particular
governmental policy, if generally publicized (and it was shown to be
a matter of public record), would have no deterrent effect at all on
the vast majority of potential offenders of the draft card law, who are
not conscientious objectors and who know that they will not resist
induction if called. It is therefore highly probable that enforcing the
law randomly against all known offenders-keeping administrative
costs at the same level as before-would have a greater over-all
deterrent effect even though fewer charges could be brought (since
it is more expensive to prosecute a draft card offense independently
of other offenses). Thus, the relationship between the government's
policy and the purpose of efficiently enforcing the draft card law may
fail even the minimum rationality test. Certainly, it could survive no
stricter scrutiny.
With regard to encouraging compliance with induction orders,
the policy may be viewed as creating a benefited class-all those who
obey induction orders and thereby escape prosecution for draft card
offenses-and a burdened class-all those who disobey induction
orders and thereby suffer prosecution for card offenses. These classes
are ideally suited to the purpose of encouraging compliance with
induction orders. But encouraging compliance 1vith invalid induction orders cannot be a legitimate governmental objective. The purpose must be redefined as encouraging compliance with valid orders
to report. With respect to this purpose, however, the burdened class
is overinclusive, as it includes those, like Falk, who have not disobeyed valid orders.
Overinclusive classes may well be regarded as more objectionable
than underinclusive classes.98 However, the traditional minimum
rationality test does not require perfect congruence between purpose
and classification.99 If the adverse effects of this overinclusive quality
fell randomly on all violators of the draft card law, the policy might
well be valid under the equal protection clause.100 But the effects are
not random; among those that violate the draft card law, consci98. Cf., e.g., United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Muny, 413 U.S. 508 (1973);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95 (1965); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
supra note 22, at 1086-87.
99. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
100. But, aside from equal protection, there are strong objections to such a policy.
By requiring those who seek judicial review of an invalid induction order to submit
to selective prosecution for card offenses, the policy chills the right of access to the
courts guaranteed by the fifth amendment's due process clause. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Moreover, the policy makes punishment for card offenses merely
an additional penalty for refusing induction. Such a broad sentencing decision should
more properly be made by the legislature. Cf. People v. Golson, 32 m. 2d 398, 207
N,E.2d 68, cert. denied, !184 U.S.1023 (1965).
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entious objectors are subject to a greater burden in two distinct ways,
First, due to the complexity and procedural difficulty of establishing a conscientious objection claim, it seems clear that a disproportionate number of invalid induction orders will be issued to registrants who .are entitled to C.O. status. Moreover, induction orders
that are invalid for some other reason are more likely to be corrected
quickly and easily within the Selective Service System's own administrative appeal procedure-without the necessity of disobeying the
order. Thus, the number of conscientious objectors prosecuted for
card offenses under this policy will be far greater than if the same
number of prosecutions were brought randomly against all offenders.
Second, even were there no such numerically discriminatory
effect, the policy of enforcing the draft card law only against those
registrants who refuse induction has a harsher impact on a conscientious objector than on an ordinary registrant. The legitimate conscientious objector will hesitate to protest an invalid induction
order if doing so will lead to a lengthy jail sentence for violation of
the draft card law.101 Falk's three-year prison sentence demonstrates
that this is not a trivial concern. But a conscientious objector in this
situation has a difficult choice; to adhere to his religious scruples
he is forced to resist the order and suffer conviction on the ancillary
card-carrying charge. The ordinary registrant faced with an invalid
induction order can simply submit to induction. Most registrants
would view this as preferable to a lengthy jail sentence for the draft
card offense, particularly if the invalidity of the induction order is
due to a temporary condition, such as administrative error or shortterm physical disability, and a valid order is likely to be issued in
the near future.
Since the free exercise of religion is a fundamental interest protected by the first amendment,102 the discriminatory impact on conscientious objectors should trigger the use of an equal protection test
more rigorous than traditional minimum rationality. Under a two:tiered analysis, this would lead to the imposition of the compelling
101. To protest a classification by the draft board, a registrant who believes he is
entitled to I-0 (conscientious objector) status may pursue an administrative remedy
through the state and presidential appeal boards without being charged with violations of the draft card law. Moreover, his induction order will be stayed until he has
exhausted these administrative appeals. But if all administrative procedures affirm the
denial of I-0 status, he can obtain judicial review only by the hazardous route of
refusing to obey an induction order and defending the criminal charge on the ground
.of improper classification. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. I 1972), amending 50
U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (1970). But compare Oesterreich v. Selective Serv. Sys., 893 U.S.
233 (1968) with Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968). The governmental policy apparently followed in Falk makes this procedure still more dangerous by subjecting the
conscientious objector to prosecution for card-carrying offenses even though he is held
. innocent of the induction-refusal charge.
102. See note 62 supra.
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governmental interest test. In a recent, similar case, the Supreme
Court formulated this test in a less rigid but still strict manner:
" ... the crucial question is whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment."103
Under either formulation, or under any form of scrutin,y stricter
than minimum rationality, it seems clear that the governmental interest in encouraging compliance with valid induction orders cannot justify the burden placed on the free exercise of religion by the
selective prosecution of the draft card law only against those who
refuse induction.
The policy of selectively prosecuting the draft card law against
those who disobey induction orders cannot be justified in light of the
discriminatory impact on conscientious objectors. Since the Selective
Service statement presented at trial constituted prima facie evidence
that this policy led to the decision to indict Falk on the card-carrying
counts, the majority's remand of the case for a hearing at which the
burden of showing that this policy was not responsible for that indictment seems correct.104
United States v. Falk is an important case for several reasons. It
continues the salutary trend (started by Crowthers and Steele) of
shifting the burden of production to the government after the
defendant's establishment of a prima facie case of discriminatory
prosecution. Second, Falk is the most important, and perhaps the
only, case105 that allows the defense of discriminatory prosecution
despite the total absence of any malice or bad faith. Falk's more
obvious claim-the first policy discussed above-did involve deliberate prosecutorial discrimination. But the majority's holding that a
prima fade case was established should only refer to the policy set
forth in the Selective Service statement-a policy to which no invidious purpose was or could be attributed. This development properly
ignores the restrictive language of Oyler v. Boles and Snowden v.
103. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). The Court cited Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), a case that involved state residency requirements for voters;
yet, voting was the first interest to be declared fundamental, Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
104. Judge Cummings' dissent states that the only purpose of the remand is to
determine the motivation of the prosecutors. 479 F.2d at 627. This is in line with bis
general preoccupation with refuting the charge of deliberate discrimination against
Falk's freedom of speech. But it seems more accurate to say that the purpose of -the
remand is to allow the government to prove that it was not following a policy of
prosecuting the draft card law only against those who refuse induction-a policy now
held to be violative of equal protection because of its effect on Falk's free exercise of
religion.
105. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 311 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Mo. 1969). Whether
Robinson involved prosecutorial "bad faith" is largely a matter of semantics. One commentator concluded that "[i]mplicit in the Robinson decision is the belief that presence of an invidious motive for prosecution is not required for a finding of discriminatory enforcement." Comment, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1234, supra note 12, at 1242.
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Hughes, and goes a long way toward fulfilling the promise of Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, that the concept of equal protection applies to laws
that are discriminatorily administered no less than to laws that are
inherently discriminatory. Unfortunately, most courts are loathe to
give the equal protection clause full rein in this area. 100 The confusion between the selection policies discussed in Falk weakens its
precedential value and allows courts that are so inclined to explain
the result as merely a simple application of Crowthers in a case of
deliberate discrimination.
Moreover, Falk is certainly an atypical discriminatory prosecution
case. It is rare, indeed, that the prosecutorial selection policy is set out
in print by the government. But, to the extent that courts, administrators, and prosecutors heed Professor Davis' advice, such instances
will become more common. Falk demonstrates that the formulation
and publication of the rules that structure executive discretion can
ensure against unwarranted interference with constitutional rights.

106. E.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973); Rhinehart v. Rhay,
440 F.2d 718,727 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1971).

